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Zombie Perennialism:
An Intelligent Design for Psychology?
A Further Response to Taylor's Soft Perennialism
Glenn Hartelius

California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA
In a recent paper Taylor has suggested that perennialist models are or should be resurgent
within transpersonal psychology. However, perennialist models such as those of Wilber
and Taylor are metaphysical philosophies of spirituality typical of New Age religions; while
such systems may be studied by a psychology that considers human spirituality, they are not
and should not be proffered as psychology. Claims that Taylor's soft perennialism are partly
evidence based are compared with invalid claims that the narrative of Noah's flood or the
Christian-based idea of intelligent design are partly evidence based. Critiques of Wilber's
integral perennialism and Taylor's soft perennialism are offered, Taylor's defenses of his
work are answered, his contributions are noted, and his concerns of inappropriate critique
are rebutted. Taylor's model may be inspiring, but it is not scientific, and not psychological.

T

Keywords: perennialism, integral theory, Ken Wilber, transpersonal psychology,
New Age religion, spirituality, intelligent design, postmetaphysical

he psychological study of spirituality sits
somewhat awkwardly at the intersection of
scientific rigor and multicultural creativity—
more so in the light of feminist and other postmodern
challenges to universal or objective knowledge. Given
that science is itself culturally and philosophically
situated, should doors be thrown open to the
construction of new contexts for the study of spirituality,
regardless of whether these meet rational criteria of
intellectual rigor? Should a transpersonal psychology,
for example, embrace alternate philosophies in a posttruth spirit (Higgins, 2016), where content is no more
important than packaging and fact earns no greater due
than appearance? This question is particularly salient in
relationship to Wilber’s metaphysically based integral
psychology, as well as current efforts to create a new
version of a similarly perennialist vision (e.g., Taylor,
2016).
While it is arguable from a postmodern
perspective that there can be many philosophical
containers, none of which carries more objective
authority than another, this does not make all
knowledge systems equally reliable. Psychology sits
within the contingencies of a scientific context that can
and likely should be informed and modified by feminist,
participatory, and postmodern critiques and broadened

through multicultural engagement in ways that mitigate
some of the limitations imposed by the particulars of
Western culture and modernist philosophy. Yet the valid
concern that cultural and philosophical values may
influence scientific process should be seen as a limitation
to be acknowledged and perhaps partially remedied
rather than as justification to invent metaphysically
based systems and represent them as valid by standards of
empirical science or psychology, or even as intellectually
rigorous postmetaphysical thought. By these standards
Wilber’s (e.g., 2000a, 2006) integral theory and Taylor’s
(2016) soft perennialism are both inspiring philosophies
of spirituality, but neither as yet finds solid footing as a
psychological approach to human spirituality.
In order to qualify for inclusion as psychology,
an idea needs to meet certain standards. One of the most
basic of these is that explanations cannot be metaphysical
in the sense that they appeal to causes on the basis of
authority or tradition rather than evidence of the sort
anyone could examine for themselves if they took the
trouble to do so. Explanations based on causes for which
there likely can be no direct evidence are more typical of
religious knowledge. For example, the Genesis story of
the creation of rainbows is an explanation of this type.
According to this eloquent literary account, rainbows
were divinely created at the end of Noah’s flood as a
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sign that God would never again destroy the earth with
a deluge (Genesis 9:12-17). Just as meteorologists cannot
accept the Genesis report to explain a particular type of
weather event, so psychology cannot accept explanations
of this type for psychological phenomena—not even in
a psychological approach to spirituality. Psychology can
examine the content, implications, and heuristic value
of metaphysical accounts, but it cannot offer them as
psychological explanations. If it were to do so, it would
be creating a de facto religious system and proffering it
in the name of scientific psychology—which is clearly
inappropriate.
This distinction is particularly important for
transpersonal psychology, given that it has been validly
critiqued for attempting to “integrate religiously-based
theories into secular psychology” (Hanegraaf, 1998, p.
51), perhaps even providing something of a template for
New Age religions. In such movements, entrepreneurs
function as experts who disembed cultural elements
of, for example, Indian, Chinese, or Native American
origin, and create “radically recontextualized versions
of how these cultural elements should be understood”;
these new narratives “require faith in their veracity,
and not hermeneutic suspicion” (Hammer, 2001, p.
46). Adherents to such religions may prefer the term
spirituality to refer to what has been identified as
secularized esotericism (Hanegraaf, 1998), yet the
typical need for faith in esoteric forces or patterns
or interpretations substantiates the religious label.
As noted by Hanegraaf (1998) in reference to some
strains of transpersonal psychology, “the transpersonal
school, positing the perennial philosophy as the proper
foundation of scientific research, has resulted in an
openly religionist psychology” (p. 51).
That the field has in some measure strayed
into metaphysical beliefs more characteristic of religion
than psychology does not mean it should give up on
the careful study of subtle, profound, or elevated states
of consciousness or mystical, spiritual, and exceptional
experiences and capacities as crucial aspects of the whole
person. In popular thought these phenomena are often
somewhat misleadingly described as metaphysical,
so there can be a concern that stepping back from
metaphysics might mean abandoning the very sorts
of topics that first inspired a transpersonal approach.
Abstaining from metaphysics refers instead to setting
aside a certain category of explanation for these
phenomena.
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For any phenomenon there can be and often
are scores of different explanations. In authoritarian
societies determinations of which explanations are better
typically come from those in power. Traditional societies,
as the name suggests, usually make traditions the basis
for such judgments. In a scientific society, it is evidence
rather than religious authority or tradition that tends to
prevail. In medieval Europe, the ability to rely on direct
observation rather than ecclesiastic or feudal authority
was revolutionary and in some ways emancipatory (cf.
Ferrer, 2002). The Copernican cosmological revision—
though it may have been less of a revolution and more
of an incremental advance due to significant reliance on
earlier Arabic astronomers (Ragep, 2007)—led eventually
to a model in which Earth revolves around the Sun rather
than vice versa. This was a triumph of data over dogma:
facts from observations that anyone who extended the
effort could make for themselves (assuming they had
the necessary social status and resources) were used to
overthrow the authority of religious power structures
that had held sway for centuries. In a sense, then, science
represented a democratization of knowledge, and in
democratic societies science has largely come to be the
arbiter of which explanations are better. As such, ideas in
psychology need to be amenable to some form of evidence
that anyone might be able to examine for themselves, and
psychology rejects metaphysical explanations because
they cannot be challenged in this way. To ask that
psychology set aside this test (e.g., Cunningham, 2015;
Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999; Taylor, 2017a) is to miss
that this criterion is the very demarcation of a scientific
approach that defines both its strength and its limits.
Of course, science has never been purely
about evidence: it also includes strains of authority
and tradition. For example, modernist Western
philosophy—a traditional way of thinking for which
there cannot be any independent evidence—is arguably
responsible for certain assumptions generally taken
for granted in scientific work: atomistic materialism
(Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999) and Cartesian-Kantian
dualism (Ferrer, 2000, 2002; Tarnas, 1991) are instances
that readily come to mind. Knowledge that does not
conform to these expectations is typically rejected or
marginalized, regardless of its merit on other grounds.
Transpersonal scholars often point to the fact
that psychology’s adoption of modernist assumptions
may artificially narrow the range of evidence considered
(e.g., Hartelius, 2014a). Specifically, there is concern that
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mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional human states,
experiences, and capacities are wrongly pathologized
or marginalized as misattributions (e.g., Grof, 2013;
Wiseman & Watt, 2006). For example, the entire field of
parapsychology has been necessitated not by an absence
of experimental evidence or rigor, but on the basis that
the field examines phenomena that have been ruled out
a priori by scientific expectations rooted in a Western
worldview (Allison, 1979; Irwin, 2007). Particularly
in the face of imperatives for psychology to develop in
ways that reflect more than Western culture, the scope of
empirical work considered to be valid may need to expand
beyond these particular cultural boundaries (cf. Fowers
& Davidov, 2006; Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Howard,
2003; Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Pedrotti & Edwards, 2014).
Yet such extensions need to be approached carefully, so
that rigor and integrity are maintained.
One approach to this challenge in whole person
approaches such as transpersonal and humanistic
psychologies has been to focus on a study of lived
experience using phenomenological and other forms of
qualitative research (cf. Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999).
Through careful attention to sensate details of particular
types of experience, psychological knowledge can be
constructed in ways that may be less shaped by modernist
or other specific worldviews and more by prereflective
experiences that may retain greater similarity across
cultural diversities. In addition there are approaches
to quantifying complex qualitative data (Hartelius,
2015a; Pekala, 1995a, 1995b; Pekala & Kumar, 2000,
2007). With these rich resources available, it becomes
possible to at least entertain notions such as James’
(1904a, 1904b) radical empiricism, which held that
only elements capable of being directly experienced
should be considered by science—and, more radically,
that all such elements should be considered, including
the experienced relations between them (cf. Laughlin
& McManus, 1995; Taylor, 1994). Despite occasional
concerns that some experiences may be ineffable (e.g.,
Osborne, 2013), there are adequate ways to convey
something of substance about a great number of human
experiences, whether mundane or exceptional.
Philosophies of mind and of spirituality still
deserve inclusion in discussions within transpersonal
psychology, as these have been of interest from the field’s
earliest days. Moreover, every psychology is likely to have
some implied philosophical assumptions. However, the
legacy of Wilber’s work raises questions about whether it

is psychology—even transpersonal psychology—when
metaphysical philosophies of spirituality are woven
together with psychological theories in ways that create
systems indistinguishable from New Age religions
(cf. Hanegraaff, 2009). Transpersonal psychology has
critiqued the imposition of explicitly modernist values
in the supposedly neutral domain of science, and has
sought to learn from spiritual traditions what wisdom
they might carry for addressing challenges of the human
mind and heart. Honoring this diversity of expressions
of spirituality, or even adopting insights and practices
from traditional contexts, is quite a different thing
from inventing systems that rely on essentially (and
essentialist) religious ideas and presenting them as if they
were scientifically validated approaches to psychology.
Creations such as Wilber’s perennialist New Age
religion can be respectfully studied by a transpersonal
psychology, but it is doubtful whether any of these
should also be presented as a transpersonal psychology.
This matter gains relevance in light of Taylor’s
(2017a, this issue) suggestion that perennialism is or
should be on the rise within transpersonal psychology.
With this optimistic suggestion he offers his own version,
soft perennialism, as successor to the work of Wilber,
which has been the target of considerable substantive
critique over the past several decades (e.g., Falk, 2009;
Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2011a; Hartelius, 2015a; Hartelius &
Ferrer, 2015; Rothberg, Kelly, & Kelly, 1998; Schneider,
1989). Taylor deserves credit for original and creative
ideas, and his effort to reconcile participatory and
perennialist thought is a worthy goal. However, a careful
analysis demonstrates that the structure of his model
is perennialist to much the same degree as Wilber’s,
and largely subject to the same critiques. In place of
Wilber’s transcendent nondual, Taylor has proposed
an immanent and all-pervasive spiritual force—what
amounts to a metaphysical interpretation of a particular
category of phenomenal experience. This force may
be experienced from many different locations on the
landscape of experience, producing the variations one
sees in religions. Taylor’s thought is as yet in early stages,
and his combination of phenomenological research with
participatory thought shows some promise—sans its
perennialist superstructure—as a transpersonal approach.
In its present form, however, the most promising portions
of Taylor’s approach is little more than a potentially
helpful topographical metaphor that may be worthy of
future development in Taylor’s thought.
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Given transpersonal psychology’s troubled
history with Wilber’s system, it seems unlikely that
resurrected or undead forms of perennialism will roam
the field’s landscape in great numbers anytime soon.
Nor does this seem a helpful strategy for the field.
If transpersonal psychology continues to expend its
credibility on grand metaphysical theories and New Age
religions, it will have little left for its potentially vital
role in contributing to a whole person psychology in
ways that can directly impact the daily lives of hundreds
of millions of people who find their experiences and
capacities marginalized or pathologized.
Making Sense of Spiritual Diversity
ears ago I watched a documentary on life in a cave
deep inside a mountain, accessible only by means
of an underground river. The fact that sightless insects
and other organisms had adapted to the very specific
conditions of this location in remarkable ways opened
my mind to the riotous variegations of life—how every
location bursts with creative expressions of the pulsing
rhythms of organic ingenuity. This is no less true for
human spirituality than it is for biological diversity,
evident not only between traditions but within them.
For example, Hinduism is often thought of as a single
tradition, yet the term is less than 200 years old (Flood,
1996), and originally referred to a broad variety of local
traditions in regions east of the Indus river (cf. Gellner,
2005).
This diversity has posed a challenge for modern
disciplines of (primarily Western) scholarship. How does
one explain the fact that spiritual traditions consistently
refer to experiences that are somehow not part of ordinary
reality, yet describe them in such inconsistent ways? How
can one make sense of experiences, practices, narratives,
and beliefs that are so diverse, and yet seem to share some
ephemeral commonalities? Transpersonal psychology
has held the position that spirituality is an aspect of the
whole person, and that its stories and practices may point
to real human capacities related to exceptional states of
consciousness. This perspective is broader than that of
orthodox religion, which typically bestows reality on
only one tradition and assumes other religions to be false
or misleading. It is also in some degree of tension with
views based in science or the humanities that reduce
spirituality to illusory constructions, denying it any form
of reality other than what it may enjoy within the fabric
of the stories that societies tell themselves. This situation
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has led some transpersonal scholars to seek explanatory
frameworks beyond conventional approaches.
For Abraham Maslow (1962/1968, 1969, 1970),
this meant expanding psychology beyond a focus on
pathology and a so-called objectivity that treated persons
uncaringly as if they were objects or animals. He believed
that humans had unique capacities—what he referred to
as “the farther reaches of human nature” (1969, p. 1)—
and that these were natural and empirical aspects that
psychology could address through a properly attuned
scientific approach (1970). However, Maslow died in
1970, just one year after the founding of the Journal of
Transpersonal Psychology.
If Maslow, the most influential founder, had
survived for another decade, his research background in
primate behavior and motivation might have guided the
field toward the kinds of empirical approaches suited to a
transpersonal psychology. With his passing much of the
field embarked on a new direction, guided by the vision
of a young Ken Wilber. In his first scholarly offering,
Wilber (1975) proposed that just as developmental
psychology traces the development of the individual
through ego maturation, so a perennial philosophy—or
philosophia perennis—could be grafted on as an extension
into beyond-ego or post-conventional development—
what he called a psychologia perennis.
Wilber’s Integral:
A New Age Religion
That Wanted to Be a Psychology
erennial philosophy holds that all spiritual traditions
are reflections of a single underlying truth, a
view that arose out of medieval efforts to reconcile
Christian theology with Judaism and Platonic thought
(Schmidt-Biggemann, 2004). Prior to Wilber, versions
of perennialism were adopted by movements such as
romanticism, American transcendentalism (Hanegraaff,
2009), theosophy (Partridge, 2013), and the traditionalist
school of esoteric thought (Diaz, 2014); such views were
expounded by early 20th century figures such as Evelyn
Underhill (Stoeber, 2013), Edgar Cayce (Hanegraaff,
2009), and Aldous Huxley (1945). Wilber’s work applied
this impulse from popular American culture to the
fledgling field of transpersonal psychology.
This is not to say that empirical research died
out entirely from transpersonal scholarship. While an
informal review of transpersonal journals will turn up
a modest if growing percentage of empirical papers
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(Hartelius, Rothe, & Roy, 2015), scholars such as Harris
Friedman (2002, 2015) and Douglas MacDonald (2013)
have consistently advocated for transpersonal psychology
as a science. Others, such as Charles Tart and Dean
Radin, have adopted what might be called an empirically
agnostic parapsychology framework within which to
conduct research on a wide variety of transpersonal
topics. At the same time, Friedman has received strong
critique of his support of empirical work within the
field (e.g., Ferrer, 2014), despite his qualification that
commitments to science should not be ideological (i.e.,
scientism; Friedman, 2002).
Wilber’s perennialist initative attempted to go
beyond a modest critique or qualification of science as
offered by Maslow, or later by Friedman, and instead
situated the field within an alternate philosophical frame.
Compared with the agnostic stance of parapsychology,
which simply sets aside a potentially limited materialist
philosophy implicit in much of psychology, the
suggestion that all spiritual paths lead toward an actual
shared spiritual reality represented what seemed like a
bold advance that affirmed human spirituality without
privileging any particular tradition. For some years
Wilber’s model was widely accepted within the field
(Needleman & Eisenberg, 1987; Rothberg, 1986). By at
least the early 2000s, the shortcomings of perennialism
generally, and Wilber’s work in particular, had come into
clearer view (Ferrer, 1998, 2000, 2002; Rothberg et al.,
1998; Schneider, 1989).
With the benefit of historical perspective, it is
possible to recognize that this philosophical initiative
was problematic from its inception. In addition to
the numerous issues identified by Ferrer (2000, 2002,
2011a), perennialism is a metaphysical philosophy of
spirituality whereas psychology is an empirical study of
the human mind and its expressions. While each of these
projects is valid in its own right, Wilber’s syncretic effort
to meld the two merely deposited versions of science and
religion into a shared container and papered over the top
so as to obscure the divide that persists between them.
Wilber’s system, a complex, convoluted, and
confidently asserted construction, remains rife with
deeply problematic fissures. A review of these requires
more time and attention than would otherwise be
warranted for a project with such extensive flaws. Yet
in some sense the sheer scope of Wilber’s undertaking
constitute grounds for careful consideration. Howard
Hughes’ massive ocean-going seaplane known as the

Spruce Goose, which earned a place in history even
though it reportedly never flew more than a mile or
gained more than 70 feet of altitude, provides an apt
metaphor for Wilber’s monumental if dubious efforts.
Given the current impulse to revive perennialist ideas
within the transpersonal field (Taylor, 2016, 2017a),
such an exercise also seems timely, since some of the
weaknesses inherent in Wilber’s approach endure into
efforts at reformulation.
The term integral suggests inclusion of everything
essential for completeness. With this name Wilber
(2000a) has seemed to propose that his all-quadrant alllevel (AQAL) model is actually a complete psychology,
“embracing the enduring insights of premodern,
modern, and postmodern sources” (p. 5). His AQAL
model looks to be an adaptation of Schumacher’s (1977)
four fields of knowledge: the inner awareness of oneself,
the inner experiences of others, considering oneself from
an objective perspective, and a study of the external
world (cf. Ferrer, 2017). These are arranged in quadrant
form, with the two left-hand quadrants representing
the interior of the individual (upper left) and of groups
(lower left); the two right-hand quadrants represent the
exterior of the individual (upper right) and of groups
(lower right). Added to this are lines from the center
of the diagram to the exterior corner of each quadrant,
representing corresponding forms of development or
evolution. Because he has been able to sort a wide variety
of phenomena into this grid based on just three variables
(singular/plural, interior/exterior, and developmental
lines), Wilber (e.g., 2000b) has represented this as a
comprehensive map of knowledge.
Contemplating aspects of developmental
psychology, evolution, and esoteric philosophy within
the same rubric is certainly thought provoking. However,
the fact that quite different types of things can be sorted
onto the same grid based on a few simple variables does
not in itself integrate these into a consistent or meaningful
whole. For example, developmental psychology does not
become compatible with the metaphysical philosophy of
perennialism just because the two are placed contiguously
on a line in a diagram; nor is the tension between
subjective and objective categories resolved by situating
two quadrants representing subjective perspectives next
to two representing objective views.
What holds together these disparate elements
in Wilber’s model is his concept of the nondual. The
nondual is the ultimate reality and the source of
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the four quadrants (Wilber, 2006, p. 288); it is the
endpoint of spiritual evolution (p. 102), and it is a state
of consciousness that unites subject and object (p. 110).
Because subjective and objective quadrants arise from
this same source, their apparent tension is resolved;
because all of creation is evolving toward this same goal,
psychological development and philosophies of spiritual
evolution can be grafted together as different parts of the
path to that goal. Without the nondual, a common New
Age religious concept (Versluis, 2014), these ill-fitting
conjoinings do not work, and Wilber’s system is little
more than an intriguing way to associate things that may
or may not be related.
Yet the nondual is a metaphysical concept, an
idea for which by definition there can be no more direct
evidence than there is for, say, God. Given this challenge,
what Wilber (2000a) has offered as verification for
this claim is, first, that the pattern he has perceived in
his study of spiritual traditions is consistent with his
theory, and second, that in his readings he has found
that others have reported what seems to him a similar
pattern. The fact that Wilber sees patterns in the data
that confirm his ideas—whether directly in his readings
of and about traditions or in the opinions of others—
is hardly compelling evidence for so large a claim. This
form of self-confirmation does not rise to being “some
version of ... objective evidence” (Wilber, 2006, p.
234) that Wilber has acknowledged as necessary. His
contention that “the discovery of these waves, over the
years, has been communally generated and consensually
validated” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 8) similarly comes with
no supporting evidence that this is the case. As such,
the essential concept that makes Wilber’s grand scheme
work relies primarily on Wilber’s assertion that it is so.
Generally, when a scholar bases an entire theory
on a concept for which there can be no substantive
evidence, the theory fails. Perhaps in part to distract
from this challenge, Wilber has made the claim that
his work is not metaphysical but postmetaphysical.
Postmetaphysical as a term has gained currency in the
wake of Richard Rorty’s (1979) first book, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature, that effectively shifted from critique
of particular epistemologies to a careful dismantling of
the enterprise of situating knowledge on some ahistorical
and transcultural basis of objective fact. In this context
the term metaphysical is used with a different meaning,
referring to the assumption that the scientific project of
grounding knowledge in empirical evidence assumes
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that this process results in some correspondence with
an external, objective reality; Rorty argued that this
assumption is false, and that scientific knowledge, as
any other form of constructed knowledge, is established
only within the meaning fabric of its community or
culture. Rorty himself envisioned that this would lead
to knowledges that embrace their own contingencies
(O’Shea, 1995). Habermas (2006) has suggested that,
in place of seeking reference to an objective world,
postmetaphysical knowledge might “become selfcritically aware of its boundaries” by “reconstruct[ing]
the history of its own genesis” (p. 16). Such approaches
to knowledge might engage with others, the world, and
existence itself in ways that Heidegger has described as
immediate and relational, even revelatory, rather than
calculated and circumscribed (Smith, 1991).
Wilber’s approach to postmetaphysics acknowledges the embeddedness of knowledge in bodies
and cultures (Esbjörn-Hargens & Wilber, 2006), but
apparently considers situating variously-embodied
knowledges within his four-quadrant framework an
adequate substitute for any actual integration. While
locating perspectives relative to a simple grid may be
helpful by placing them within a particular given frame,
any such frame is itself a perspective that has its own
history and contingencies—a fact that Wilber (2006)
has seemed to deny by identifying the integral stage
of development—ostensibly represented by his integral
framework—as “aperspectival” (pp. 242, 243). In this
way Wilber has exempted his own AQAL framework
from the necessary constraints of postmetaphysics, while
simultaneously claiming to be postmetaphysical.
Wilber’s position seems to be that his fourquadrant model is aperspectival, perhaps because of a
sense that it has emerged on its own from the data of
spiritual traditions through his engagement with this
material, and as corroborated by so-called “perennial
sages” (2000a, p. 8). If this were so, it would seem that
the integral theory framework must reflect reality in
some profound way. Yet his claim that this knowledge
has some factual correspondence with objective reality
is precisely the sort of metaphysically naïve stance—
following Rorty’s definition of metaphysical—that
Wilber has claimed to transcend.
The implied assertion that integral theory
constitutes an inherently integrating context may come
from the idea that “all four [of Wilber’s] quadrants co-arise
and are different aspects of the same occasion” (Esbjörn-
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Hargens & Wilber, 2006, p. 544), which seems to be a
more developed version of Wilber’s (1977) early vision
that subjectivity and objectivity reflect complementary
aspects of a primary dualism arising out of the ultimate
reality of nondual awareness. The notion of considering
together various types of knowledge is far from original;
the claim that simply placing subjective and objective
approaches in proximal quadrants will restore some
primordial unity may be overly optimistic, and again
reflects the metaphysical origins of Wilber’s work in
two senses: it assumes an intimate correspondence
between subjectivity and objectivity (metaphysical in
Rorty’s sense), and it postulates an ultimate reality for
which there can be no public evidence (metaphysical
in a more conventional sense). His later addition of
intersubjective and interobjective approaches (EsbjörnHargens & Wilber, 2006) adds complexity, but neither
resolution or clarity. It seems safe to conclude that
Wilber’s integral approach is not postmetaphysical, even
by its own definitions of that term. An authentically
postmetaphysical approach might extend Rorty’s
critique of mind as a mirror of nature by “put[ting] to
rest the equally problematic image of contemplative or
visionary ‘consciousness as mirror of spirit’ implicit in
much classical and contemporary spiritual discourse”
(Ferrer, 2017, p. 193); however, such a stance would
discredit Wilber’s entire system.
This is but one of the key failures of integral
theory. The fact that multiple philosophies and
spiritualities are considered makes it in some ways
encyclopedic, but this is different than containing
everything necessary for a comprehensive map of
knowledge, or even for a complete psychology; in this
sense Wilber’s approach is not meaningfully integral. Its
solution to subject-object dualism and spiritual diversity
relies on a perennialist notion of transcendent nondual
reality that has more in common with religion than with
science or scholarship or a psychology (cf. Hartelius &
Ferrer, 2015). Assertions that the approach is supported
by objective evidence fall well short, as do claims that
it is not metaphysical, or that it is not perennialist (cf.
Hartelius, 2015a).
Each of these questionable claims has been
advanced with clever turns of phrase that do not stand
up to critical examination. Some years ago at a state fair
I purchased a set of six kitchen knives that, according to
the enthusiastic salesman, never needed sharpening. I got
more than my money’s worth in years of use, but only

Taylor’s Soft Perennialism:
Another New Age Religion
With Psychology Aspirations
hile Wilber’s ideas are no longer dominant within
transpersonal psychology (cf. Ferrer, 2011b),
Taylor (2016) has offered a revised, soft perennialism
that proposes a varied landscape of spiritual paths
and destinations rather than a single transcendent
ultimate. In response to recent critique (Hartelius,
2016), Taylor (2017a, this issue) has offered an extended
clarifying response. With some caveats, Taylor’s revised
explanation of his landscape metaphor of spiritual paths
seems potentially compatible both with scientific inquiry
into certain types of spiritual experience as state-specific
phenomena (Hartelius, 2007, 2015b; Tart, 1972; Varela,
1996), as well as with participatory approaches (cf. Ferrer,
2017) within which a state of consciousness could be one
aspect of an individual’s locatedness (Hartelius, 2015b;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2015). This part of his approach
does not qualify as perennialist in any conventional
sense, and is well within the range of other transpersonal
approaches.
A second major element in Taylor’s (2016) soft
perennialism is his claim that from different locations
on this experiential landscape, an all-pervasive spiritual
force or spiritual energy will be perceived differently—to
some it will appear as an ultimate transcendent reality,
as in Wilber’s perennialism; to others it may appear in
other forms. This notion, which in his response (2017a)
he acknowledges as explicitly metaphysical, is apparently
his effort to reconcile participatory and perennialist
approaches.
While Taylor (2016) has echoed several
important critiques of Wilber, his attempt at a solution
follows Wilber’s strategy of resorting to a metaphysical
concept that cannot be independently verified or
falsified (more on Taylor’s stance toward science later)
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later learned that these knives did not need sharpening
because they could not be sharpened. By at times using
arguments akin to a sales pitch designed to conceal
flaws rather than illuminate, Wilber’s work appears to
have more in common with a professionally marketed
commercial product than a carefully constructed area of
knowledge. As a product, Wilber’s integral theory may
in fact be quite satisfactory for some popular audiences
(Hartelius, 2015a), but it is crucial that within scholarly
fields its nature be clearly discerned.

W

as a way to resolve otherwise incommensurable elements.
With the addition of this metaphysical claim, it gains a
structure that directly parallels Wilber’s integral theory:
a metaphysical constant that can be experienced from
multiple standpoints. For Wilber, the constant is a
singular, transcendent nondual that can be perceived and
described from various cultural locations; for Taylor it is
an all-pervading spiritual force that can be experienced
and described from various experiential locations.
The perennialism of Taylor’s version is
constructed differently than Wilber’s, and following
Daniels’ (2005, 2009; cf. Wilber, 1995) distinction
between paths that ascend toward transcendence and
those that descend toward underlying immanence, might
be characterized as a descending perennialism, in contrast
with Wilber’s ascending perennialism. Although Taylor’s
(2016) perennialism appears novel in some aspects, and
might warrant the creation of another category in Ferrer’s
(2002) typology of perennialisms, it does not seem softer,
in the sense of less problematically metaphysical, than
Wilber’s.
Given the perennialist nature of its overall
structure, Taylor’s (2016) soft perennialism is necessarily
subject to many of the same critiques as Wilber’s integral
perennialism (e.g., Ferrer, 2000, 2011a; Hartelius & Ferrer,
2015), or as Taylor has referred to it, hard perennialism.
Taylor’s argument is that his own metaphysical claims
are not entirely speculative because they are congruent
with empirical phenomenological data, and therefore are
“to some degree evidence-based” (p. 82). This is a key
assertion that deserves careful consideration, resonating
as it does with Wilber’s claim that his approaches to
validation represent some version of objective evidence.
I was educated in a conservative community
that believed Earth was created in seven literal days,
and that Noah built a wooden ark that saved human
and animal life from a flood that covered the entire
planet. According to this view, paleontologists who take
fossils and other materials as evidence of evolution are
misreading the catastrophic aftermath of the biblical
flood. For example, in a college course I learned that
bible-believing scholars have argued for flood-friendly
explanations of fossil forests—continuing an interpretive
tradition that reaches back to at least the 17th century
(Gastaldo, 1999). Fossil records in some areas have been
seen as representing numerous forests that grew one
after another, punctuated by some form of destruction,
creating geological records spanning tens of thousands of

years. But if there had been a worldwide flood, perhaps
these same features might have been created by log mats,
clusters of stumps from the destruction of the planet’s
forests that may have aggregated in certain areas due
to currents in the receding waters of Noah’s flood (cf.
Oard & Giesecke, 2007). When my sources extended
beyond this carefully curated evidence, it slowly became
apparent that these so-called creation scientists were
in fact searching the literature for evidence that might
somehow be read in ways that supported their prior
beliefs, or for minor inconsistencies that could be used
to challenge the prevailing view of a geological history
reaching back longer than a miraculous divine creation
of the world some 6,000 years ago. Highly selective
readings of empirical evidence do not turn the exquisite
mythic narratives of the Genesis creation stories into
geological history. Yet following Taylor’s (2017a) example,
such efforts—as well as many far more inflammatory
half-truths—could be misleadingly afforded the status
of being "evidence-based” (p. 86).
As this example demonstrates, the issue is not
just about empirical evidence itself, but also the lens
through which facts are viewed. Intelligent design is a nowdiscredited effort to use scientific research in support of
metaphysical ideas drawn from biblical creationism (e.g.,
Wells, 2000; cf. Coyne, 2001). In doing so, intelligent
design used scientific fact, but attempted to interject
an interpretive lens based in an entirely religious idea.
The result is not so much a conciliation of science and
religion as the subversion of scientific evidence in support
of a religious vision. One might make a similar case
regarding Wilber’s incorporation of psychology in a New
Age religious system based on the nondual; Taylor’s soft
perennialism is, in like manner, a religious model based
on an immanent, all-pervading spiritual force, that has
incorporated phenomenological studies of a particular
type of (sometimes) spiritual experience. Of course,
religious ideas deserve full appreciation and respect, but
as religious ideas, not as scientific or psychological ones,
not even when they claim an unverifiable relationship to
empirical data.
In fact, it is the nature of metaphysical concepts
within religions to explain some mundane experience
through appeal to a hidden or undemonstrable cause. In
this way, virtually every such idea is related to empirically
observable phenomena. For example, in Navajo tradition
the presence of people is explained by their predecessors,
the insect-like air-spirit people or Níłch’ i dine`é, who
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emerged from deep within the earth (Zolbrod, 1987); in
ancient Near Eastern tradition weather events are caused
by a storm god, often Baal (Green, 2003); and in the text
of the biblical book of Genesis the origin of humans is
ascribed to divine creation by either Elohim or Yahweh. In
each of these cases a religious idea is in some sense based
on empirical phenomena, yet it would be extraordinary
to claim that this fact constitutes empirical evidence
for the associated religious concepts. For example, the
presence of humans today is not evidence that the Níłch’ i
dine`é existed in the past in some Western historical
sense. The fact that Wilber’s (2006) and Taylor’s (2016)
metaphysical ideas are, similarly, extrapolations from
empirical and experiential evidence does not make these
ideas any less metaphysical, or any more empirically
based.
Taylor (2016, 2017a, 2017b) has presented some
empirical evidence, and its strength and import deserves
close attention, since he has placed such emphasis on
this feature. On the basis of preliminary evidence for
a type of experience that at least does not conflict with
his soft perennialism, he has claimed that these findings
constitute some degree of empirical evidence for his
metaphysical theory. If one postulates a theory and then
finds empirical evidence that supports that theory, this
would seem to constitute meaningful confirmation. Yet
evidence that a type of experience occurs is not evidence
for any particular explanation of that experience or
theory about its significance. For example, someone who
believed Earth had been visited by alien space travelers
in the ancient past might point to the Uffington White
Horse—a (likely) ancient stylized figure of a horse in
England’s Berkshire Downs formed by trenches filled
with white chalk and stretching longer than a football
field—as an example of art that must have been designed
to be seen from high above. Yet just because such a chalk
figure could be made to fit within a theory about alien
space visitors does not make it into evidence that such
visitors existed. Taylor has offered empirical evidence, but
it is evidence for the existence of a type of experience,
not for his perennialist explanations of that experience. In
this sense, the evidence that Taylor has offered does not
even apply to his soft perennialism, let alone support it.
Taylor is not the first to conflate an experience
with a metaphysical claim about that experience.
Cunningham (2015) has made the argument, based on
a Jamesian radical empiricism stance, that transpersonal
experiences can reveal “transcendental realities” (p. 104),

and that because the channeled materials attributed to
the purported entity named Seth have a certain coherence
and impact it is inexcusable to claim that this entity is
unreal. However, the Seth materials are only empirical
evidence of an experience or process that resulted in these
materials, not in the literal reality of the disembodied
entity to which they are ascribed. Until and unless relevant
evidentiary processes can be developed for validating
this latter claim, it remains entirely metaphysical. If I
were to claim that chickens have feathers because these
were a gift from Hermes, winged messenger of the
gods, photographic evidence of chickens with feathers
would not constitute empirical evidence for the god
Hermes or for the divine origin of chicken feathers. If
Cunningham (2015) has intended this argument for
the reality of the Seth entity as an example of what he
named transpersonal empiricism, then the latter appears
to be a practice of uncritically commingling empirical
data with metaphysical interpretations of those data—a
practice to be scrupulously avoided (Hartelius, 2016)—
rather than a meaningful form of empiricism.
This is not to suggest that all of Taylor’s work
is equally problematic. His approach contains two
quite different strategies that neatly illustrate what may
be a useful divide between science and religion in a
transpersonal psychology. His landscape metaphor, in
which there are many potential ranges of exceptional
human experience and even more paths through them,
allows for spiritual diversity and also situates such
experiences within the domain of what a psychology may
be able to encompass. His all-pervasive spiritual force,
on the other hand, is a metaphysical interpretation of
phenomenological experience that is firmly in line with
religious thought. By attempting the worthy project of
reconciling a participatory approach with a perennialist
model, Taylor has succeeded only in creating a new
form of perennialism. While this may be rightly valued
in the domain of popular spirituality, it is likely not a
psychology—transpersonal or otherwise.
There is a subtle but crucial concern to be
addressed here: A transpersonal psychology has interest
in the culturally situated approaches to mental and
emotional difficulties that are often contained within
spiritual traditions, including the hermeneutical value of
explicitly religious texts (cf. Lancaster, 2015), and how
these might inform the culturally situated discipline of
psychology (cf. Friedman, 2017); to this end, through
an interest in plural epistemologies (e.g., Ferrer, 2002)
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and multiple ways of knowing (e.g., Hastings et al.,
2001), the field has a demonstrated interest in softening
the bounds of its own cultural location. Yet a challenge
inherent in this process is how to gain a broader and more
flexible base of contingent assumptions without wholly
undercutting the demonstrated benefits of a critical and
scientific approach—that is, without jettisoning what
makes transpersonal a psychology.
Perennialist positions do affirm multiple cultural
locations, but in order for this kind of approach to work
it is necessary to transparently abandon any pretense of
scientific scholarship. A perennialist approach asserts
that one particular spiritual vision—one out of the
thousands that have been crafted—is the correct account
of all of human spirituality, and explains all other versions
as lesser or partially informed variants of its own vision.
In this way perennialism is necessarily and intrinsically
hierarchical—even soft perennialism, despite Taylor’s
(2016) claims to the contrary. As has been noted, such a
stance is more typical of orthodox proselytizing religions
than of any form of modern scholarship. Furthermore,
one is asked to accede to this rather grand assertion
without any direct evidence of the sort that can be shared
with others. In other words, one has to examine their
own personal experience and decide whether or not to
accept the account of a person who claims to hold an
authoritative insight. While such a conversion process
happens routinely and appropriately within many of the
world’s religions, it is rather less fitting to proffer it under
the guise of a psychology.
On the other hand, some may feel that science is
not an adequate container for a human psychology, and that
spirituality is too vital and too powerful to be constrained
by the requirements of such a mundane discipline. For
example, Taylor (2017a) defends his metaphysically
based approach by rejecting suggestions that the shared
biological heritage of the human family might be in any
way correlated with similarities in what he has identified
as awakening experiences across a variety of religious and
secular contexts; his concern is that these might constitute
neuroscientific reductionism. It is apparently his rejection
of any correlations with the body that create an urgent
need for a perennialist position, for once biological factors
are eliminated some other explanation for experiential
similarities needs to be sought.
Yet there may be more evidence for correlations
between mental events and neural activity than Taylor
has represented (e.g., Hinterberger, Zlabinger, &

Blaser, 2014), and neurobiological theories need not be
reductionist. If the whole person is an interconnected
living system, then surely many of its aspects will reflect
the processes of the whole. For example, an acupuncturist
placing needles in the ear to treat organ systems of the body
would seem to be seeing the whole interactively reflected
in a part in a way that is not especially reductive. Seeing
the nervous system as reflecting the whole person in a
similar way does not require subscribing to a bottom-up
biological perspective. Indeed, a whole person approach
to psychology that specifically excluded neurobiology
would be somewhat paradoxical. General similarities
do seem to exist in some aspects of spiritual experience
in various contexts, and while these appearances do not
always survive closer examination or broader samplings,
for similarities that do survive scrutiny there are better
explanations than perennialism. A neurobiological
theory greatly reduces any urgent need for explanation
by some some form of perennialism, and is considerably
more parsimonious.
Furthermore, reductionism is not always
problematic. Qualitative research, including Taylor’s
(2012) own qualitative research, involves a process of
reducing transcripts to themes; explanatory reduction
enables complex information to be grasped in terms of
salient features; even language entails reducing many
unique phenomena to a single category such as dog or
door. Sense perception itself requires that the “blooming,
buzzing confusion” (James, 1890, p. 488) be reduced
to manageable impressions, to which end education
exerts great efforts. Naïve naturalistic or materialistic
reductionism can be problematic (cf. MacDonald &
Friedman, 2012), but the mere fact that a process involves
some reduction should not make it immediately suspect.
Concerns among transpersonal scholars
about an overly simplistic mechanical or materialist
interpretation of spiritual experience are not wrong, nor
are critiques of the limitations of empiricism misplaced
(cf. Ferrer, 2014). The reach of science is limited, and
there is by now a long history of effective critiques of
rational empirical approaches including Foucault (1970),
Derrida (1976), de Beauvoir (1949), Hartsock (1983),
Lyotard (1984), and Rorty (1979), among many others;
as a result it has become clear that science is a culturally,
historically, and even gender situated project that cannot
yield knowledge of a discrete and objective world. Nor is
there an external standard by which knowledge systems
can be compared, since all knowledge construction is
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situated within similar contingencies. Yet critiques of
science are implicitly predicated on its presence rather
than serving as an adequate case for its absence; similarly,
the fact that a liberal democracy allows criticism of
government—often well deserved—is no argument for
replacing it with an absolute monarch under whom no
such dissent would be tolerated. In this sense, for the
work of building a diverse psychology of the whole
person, it is likely better to have a fallible science than an
infallible religion.
In this light, what is particularly troubling
in Taylor’s (2017a) stance toward science is a false
equivalency that takes the unavoidable presence of some
metaphysical assumptions within science as license to
invent systems that rely substantively and uncritcally
on grand universal assumptions that are untestable by
any empirical means. This approach carries no small
risk: If applied to media it would suggest that since all
news reporting inevitably has some bias, then outright
fabrications, lies, and alternative facts are of equal status
as careful journalism; it could likewise be used to argue
that since most politicians may be corrupt to a greater
or lesser degree, it matters not whether a shamelessly
corrupt person is elected to high office. Any review of
current or historical events will show such reasoning to
be dangerously wrong. False equivalencies of this sort
are characteristic of a simplistic, even opportunistic
brand of post-truth postmodernism that appears to have
gained some currency in Western societies during recent
decades. At times more well intended versions of this
same reasoning have appeared even within transpersonal
circles.
Despite this strain of thought, evidence matters
and the quality of knowledge matters, even within a
contingent system. Every day human lives and cultures
depend on tested approaches to knowledge being
implemented with as much integrity as possible. While
ongoing critique and refinement of those approaches
is part of maintaining their integrity, pointing to
limitations does not warrant the cavalier discarding of
effective if imperfect systems of knowledge construction.
When I travel to and from my university, I drive an aging
dark grey Honda sedan. It has a big dent in one fender
where someone backed into it and fled. It no longer gets
the gas mileage it used to, there is sun damage to the
upholstery, and my mechanic tells me a couple of axles
will need to be replaced. I would not rely on it to hold up
offroad or across country. Though fallible and limited, I

still find it quite reliable for most of my needs on a day
to day basis. In a similar way, science does not need to be
perfect in order to be generally reliable.
Respect for the careful methods of science does
not mean surrender to naïve materialism, or a physicalism
that attempts to explain all phenomena in the stark terms
of physics (Strawson, 2006). Nor does it imply, as Taylor
(2017a) would have it, that transpersonal psychology
would need to give up the study of psychic phenomena
or nondual and transcendent states of consciousness.
There is a very large difference between a subtle skill or
experience or state of consciousness, and metaphysical
interpretations of those phenomena or notions about
ultimate sources of reality or all-pervasive spiritual forces.
While the latter are speculative constructions that by their
nature cannot be confirmed using any form of public
evidence, the former can be studied phenomenologically
in ways that are congruent with scientific methods.
What Taylor has advanced is an entirely false dichotomy
between wholesale acceptance of spiritual-metaphysical
speculations within psychology and the sterile constraints
of logical positivism. There is ample middle ground that
can be productive without falling prey to either of these
extremes (cf. Friedman, 2015).
In addition, other strategies such as pursuing
Tart’s (1972) suggestion that science has largely been
implemented within the context of a single, conventional
state of consciousness and carries a paradigm that reflects
this, opens the possibility of applying the processes of
scientific method within the context of other states of
consciousness. If such states of consciousness can be
adequately described and defined (Hartelius, 2015b), then
applying scientific method within selected nonordinary
states (cf. Varela, 1996) may help to overcome an overly
mechanistic approach (cf. Cunningham, 2015) without
abandoning the strengths of scientific scholarship or
resorting to uplifting but critically vulnerable spiritual
visions.
What will serve is not new religious systems that
posture as psychologies, but approaches that attempt the
challenging work of understanding as much as possible
of the dynamic processes of the whole person within the
full range of human cultures and contexts. In this effort,
good tools with long histories of powerful application
such as critical thought and empirical evidence should not
be reified, nor should they be too readily marginalized or
disregarded simply because they exist within contingent
systems that remain limited and imperfect.
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Conclusion
aylor’s (2016) work, like Wilber’s, is a thoughtful
and inspiring spiritual vision that also takes the
trouble to consider empirical data in the context of its
metaphysical speculations. As with Wilber, Taylor’s
project is not psychological, even though it appeals to
psychological studies; as with intelligent design, it is not
scientific. Whether or not a handful of contemporary
academics support perennialist or essentialist positions
does not make soft perennialism more critically sound.
At the same time, Taylor deserves credit for accepting
critique graciously and for engaging in scholarly debate
in a vigorous and constructive manner. His approach may
not make as much progress as one might hope on the
difficult challenge of understanding human spirituality;
as a new variant of perennialism rising in response to
critiques of Wilber’s work, Taylor has retained many of
the key shortcomings of perennialism. On the other hand,
if his writings can provide inspiration and acceptance
of diversity among popular readers in this subject area,
then they serve a worthy cause—despite falling short on
scholarship and remaining outside of psychology.
There is also some contribution to scholarship
even in soft perennialism. Wilber’s work explicated a
perennialist position so thoroughly that he generated careful
critical examination of this strategy, and thereby largely
dispelled the notion that such an approach might still hold
some promise for psychology (Hartelius, 2015a). Taylor
has extended this contribution by inviting consideration
of an idea also advanced by Blackstone (2006), namely
of a pervasive, immanent spiritual force as the source of
spiritual experience. It seems likely this soft perennialist
option will not be much more successful within psychology
than Wilber’s version, but it has taken Taylor’s exposition
of this idea for the matter to be carefully reviewed. There is
much scientific research that ends in blind alleys and cul de
sacs, and the work that identifies these is no less important
than that which results in breakthrough findings in other
directions.
What deserves to be critiqued in Wilber and
Taylor is the blurring of lines between psychology and
religion. Even in what may be a postmetaphysical world
populated by multiple knowledge frames, psychology
cannot be radically reinvented without consideration of its
historical and cultural contingencies. These contingencies
are both its limitations and its ability to contain knowledge.
The diversities of a multicultural world and the imperative

to understand the whole human person demand that
existing containers of knowledge be carefully reshaped
and enlarged in more inclusive ways—not only for moral
and political reasons but also because this enhances the
integrity of psychological knowledge (Hartelius, 2014b).
Yet such work demands more critical discernment and
rigor, not less.
For example, while it has become commonplace
to suggest that religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or
Christianity constitute or include psychologies of some
sort, it is important to make a distinction between formal
and informal uses of the term. In an informal sense, it is
accurate and respectful to acknowledge that these venerated
systems often include hermeneutically useful frames,
wise observations, and pragmatic practices for addressing
issues of mind and heart, life and relationship (Friedman,
2017). This plainly does not make their metaphysical or
soteriological constructs transferable into psychology,
even though efforts to do just this persist (e.g., Crabb,
1981; cf. Friedman, 2009, 2010). Yet when Wilber (e.g.,
2000) or Taylor (e.g., 2017b) blend New Age religions with
psychological concepts, there is an implied claim that the
entire product—including its explicitly religious ideas—is
valid psychology in the formal sense of the academic and
scientific discipline. This is inaccurate and misleading.
Taylor (2017b), as Wilber before him, has offered
his New Age religion to the public as psychology, and has
submitted his thought for publication in a transpersonal
journal—an action that merits response from the field. In
order to do so constructively, this journal has published
Taylor’s (2016) scholarly presentation of his work, notified
him in advance that it would not be published without a
critical response, and has offered him a generous forum
for reply to this critique (Taylor, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
In addition, this journal has extended an invitation to
interested scholars to join and broaden the conversation.
The intent is both that Taylor should have a forum to
present his ideas clearly and engage with critique, and that
the larger conversation of relations between science and
religious views might be revisited.
Scholarship should strive to be accurate, transparent, and fair. Direct and explicit critique of scholarly
work is not attack, despite Taylor’s (2017a) complaint;
articulation of possible shortcomings, along with robust
debate, is how any scholarly field betters itself. Taylor’s
concern that a critical response was published in the same
issue is curious, given the fact that scholarly replies are
frequently published in the same issue as target papers.
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In the spirit of entirely conventional critique it
can be noted that Taylor’s work seems as yet somewhat
in flux. For example, in his response Taylor (2017a)
has acknowledged the metaphysical nature of the
pervasive spirit force postulated in his approach, despite
stating clearly in his 2016 paper that this force “is not
metaphysical because it pervades the physical world”
(p. 31). He claimed retrospectively (2017a) that he did
not intend to imply that his approach does not make
metaphysical claims, even though he had earlier avowed
(2016) that it was “possible to advocate a softer form of
perennialist approach without necessarily positing or
adhering to a clearly defined metaphysical system” (pp. 1920). In his (2016) initial presentation he offered his work
as perennialist, then later (2017a) he has expressed interest
in changing its identity to essentialist. His writing does
not reflect a full awareness of the relationship between
evidence and metaphysical speculation, or appreciate that
the latter by definition cannot be evidence-based. This
sort of problematic ambiguity has led to a concern about
whether Taylor’s advance into publishing popular books on
his work as if it were psychology may have been premature
(Hartelius, 2016). While Taylor (2017a) has characterized
this concern as hostile, the fact that these basic issues are
still being sorted out in his writing evidences the problem
clearly enough; pointing to these issues is no more hostile
than, say, copyediting. The question is not whether Taylor’s
work is shoddy, to use his own (2017a) term, but whether
it has been adequately vetted in scholarly circles to warrant
broad public circulation as a product of the scientific field
of psychology.
Taylor’s (2016) spiritual vision is uplifting,
his conviction is admirable, and his interest in
empirical evidence is commendable. His work in
the phenomenological study of a particular type of
experience may be important if properly validated.
These merits do not save his soft perennialism from
critical shortcomings that may well be insurmountable
within his current framework. The proposal to rename
his approach essentialist phenomenology does not change
the structure of the work, which remains perennialist
and metaphysical, with phenomenology playing only
an ancillary role in a much larger schema. Neither
adjustments in terminology nor minor updates and
expansions of Taylor’s selective literature review will
remedy this. His case is not strengthened by empirical
evidence that merely permits rather than supports his
speculative ideas. Since these ideas are already problematic

on other grounds, and because better explanations exist,
the case for his version of perennialism remains largely
unconvincing. Perennialist spiritual philosophies remain
unworkable within psychology, and Taylor’s version is no
exception.
One might ask why Taylor even wishes to situate
his work within psychology—why his most recent book,
for example, is subtitled, The Psychology of Spiritual
Awakening (Taylor, 2017b)—when his writings reflect
such deep suspicion of neuroscientific explanations and
minimal regard for scholarly standards of what constitutes
evidence. The role of spiritual teacher, as exemplified by
Eckhart Tolle who has written the introduction to his
book, is perfectly respectable and more in keeping with
the substance and thrust of Taylor’s efforts. What deserves
careful scrutiny is occasions when a spiritual teacher
inappropriately incorporates a bit of scientific research
into a spiritual vision and then offers the resulting product
as psychology. It is doubtful that bad science makes for
better spirituality. However, Taylor would encounter no
critique here if he were to refrain from representing his
vision as some version of psychology, which it clearly
is not. Transpersonal psychology has been down this
same road with Ken Wilber’s work, which ended with a
popularized metaphysical theory of everything that has
little credibility within the serious scholarship of any
discipline, let alone psychology. The field would do well
to apply lessons learned from this history to Taylor’s new
version of much the same approach.
There is richness, depth, and subtlety to the
human person that psychology attempts but often fails
to fully capture. These omissions, though sometimes
peripheral from the perspective of psychology, are often
central to what motivates, inspires, and transforms
human life. Transpersonal approaches to the mind and
to states of consciousness hold the opportunity and
perhaps even the responsibility to contribute somatic,
phenomenal, relational, and transformative facets to the
wider discipline; doing so may support a broadening
of psychology so that it becomes less focused on the
Western individual and more inclusive of the whole
human person and of broader ranges of communities and
cultures. Perhaps it will become possible to acknowledge
that perennialist strategies such as those of Wilber and
Taylor, while seeming an appealing shortcut to such goals,
have failed to deliver. Efforts invested in inventing and
defending new versions of this ephemeral, universalizing
grand theory approach (cf. Wright, 1996) might be better
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spent developing more specific work that can contribute to
the field modestly, pragmatically, and in socially engaged
ways (cf. Brooks, 2010; Ferrer, 2011a; Friedman, 2015).
In this process, transpersonal psychology
requires active debate in order to progress, just as any
other academic field. The values that it needs to live up to
are scholarly, not spiritual, because it is a psychology, not a
religious movement. The field examines mystical, spiritual,
and other exceptional human experiences and capacities
in a scientific frame at least partly corrected for artificial
prejudices introduced by unacknowledged modernist
assumptions. As such, transpersonal psychology strives
for inclusion of viewpoints, cultures, traditions, genders,
ways of knowing, and varieties of lived experience, but not
for the incorporation of New Age religions—or any other
religions—as a part of psychology.
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